



# **One Year After the Fall of the Authoritarian Regime: Expectations and Realities**

## **Executive Summary**

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## One Year After the Fall of the Authoritarian Regime: Expectations and Realities

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## Preface

The fall of the authoritarian government through an unparalleled sacrifice in the anti-discrimination movement stands as a golden achievement in Bangladesh's history, creating an unprecedented opportunity to build a 'New Bangladesh' through state reform and a new political and social order. On 05 August 2024, the authoritarian government was overthrown following a movement demanding reform of the quota system in government jobs, where widespread participation of students and the mass people, especially women and working-class people, was prominent. Subsequently, the twelfth national parliament was dissolved, and an interim government took power on August 8 of the same year. The core expectation of the students and people who led the anti-discrimination movement was to establish a state structure and a new political and social order suitable for building a non-discriminatory, equal rights-based, and inclusive 'New Bangladesh'. The primary goal was to bring about radical changes in public representation, government, and administrative systems, ensuring that the state would be run based on the people's mandate and delegated authority, with effective accountability to the people. In this transformational process, the interim government and other stakeholders are playing crucial roles while there are multi-dimensional challenges and risks on the way.

Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) aims to establish democracy, good governance, and prevent corruption in the country through conducting multi-faceted research and advocacy on various public interest sectors and institutions at both national and local levels, particularly concerning transparency and accountability. In this connection, TIB proposed a set of recommendations to the interim government on August 28, 2024, aimed at creating a new political arrangement and necessary reforms in the state structure. Subsequently, TIB has continued to present and publish sector-specific policy briefs, provide reviews and opinions on various draft laws, submit recommendations to different task forces and committees, and engage with high-level government officials, including advisors of the interim government.

To fulfil the expectations of state reform and ensure transparency and accountability, it is important to regularly monitor the activities of the interim government and all other relevant stakeholders. In this context, a research report titled 'New Bangladesh': Tracking the First 100 Days after the Fall of the Authoritarian Regime was published on November 18, 2024. Following this, a new study titled 'One Year After the Fall of the Authoritarian Regime: Expectations and Realities' was undertaken, which observed the events of the first year after the fall of the authoritarian government. This research observed the various steps taken by the interim government, especially regarding fair investigation and justice for crimes and human rights violations committed during and before the anti-discrimination movement; reforms of the state, political, and electoral structures; and events related to holding a free, fair, and participatory election as soon as possible. The study also reviewed the government's regular activities in various sectors (e.g., law and order, finance, education, health, local government, power and energy, environment, overseas employment, international relations); its efforts to prevent irregularities and corruption, and to stop money laundering; and the roles of relevant stakeholders (political parties, civil society, media, military).

The research findings show that the fall of the authoritarian government, brought about by unprecedented sacrifice in the anti-discrimination movement, has created an extraordinary opportunity to build a 'New Bangladesh' through state reform and a new political and social order. In this transformational process, the interim government and other stakeholders are playing important roles. Despite facing numerous internal and external challenges, the interim government has taken significant initiatives and decisions over the past year in areas like justice, reform, elections, and running the government. However, there are numerous challenges in implementing these initiatives and steps. Nevertheless, in the light of good governance, several limitations have been observed in the aforementioned sectors, which indicate a failure to achieve the desired goals of establishing a well-governed, corruption-free, and accountable government.

The research also reveals that there is no concrete information about the implementation of the 'immediate recommendations' of the reform commissions. In many cases, the implementation of these recommendations is mired in bureaucratic complexity, and a tendency to 'pick and choose' certain recommendations is visible. The interim government's failure to formulate and publish a clear and well-

planned strategy and roadmap for its entrusted duties, namely justice, state reform, and elections, has at times led to a crisis of trust among stakeholders.

The government's decision-making process shows an ad-hoc tendency, a lack of firmness and a concrete action plan in administration, and a lack of coordination among responsible officials when making decisions. These are evident in the indecisiveness of the government or in changing decisions after they have been made. In administrative and institutional reforms, while there have been attempts to free institutions from politicization by removing high-ranking officials, this has often resulted in the replacement of one party's loyalists with another's, effectively continuing the cycle of politicization. Furthermore, instability within state institutions, including the police and administration, attempts to create a new political block, and widespread reshuffling has led to institutional ineffectiveness. In these areas, the government's lack of control was evident. Overall, initiatives for institutional reform have been resisted by the internal forces, and preventing the realization of the reform at the desired level.

Disagreements and conflicts have arisen among the stakeholders involved in the movement due to a narrow focus on their own agendas, which has put the implementation of the state reform aspirations stemming from the mass uprising into an uncertainty. Clear divisions have been observed on the issue of fundamental reforms, and more emphasis has been placed on gaining power through elections. Unfortunately, there has been no fundamental change in Bangladesh's political culture—a culture of partisan politics, extortion, illegal occupation, and dominance continues. This poses a major challenge to upholding the core spirit of the anti-discrimination movement and achieving the goals of state reform and a new political order.

Disclosure of information and freedom of expression remain under challenge. While the overall environment for freedom of speech may seem to be indicative of an open environment for collaboration and criticism from civil society, there is a visible trend of some groups gaining excessive power and its abuse, as well as imposing ideals. These are considered as barriers to establish a non-discriminatory, equal rights based, and inclusive 'New Bangladesh'. Over the past one year, the development and influence of religion-based politics have become acutely visible. In many cases, violence and coercion have put gender, religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity at risk, which contradicts the spirit of the anti-discrimination movement.

In conclusion, the path to fulfilling the expectation that authoritarian practices can be effectively prevented is a difficult one, given that major parties and their allies have agreed to the July Charter with 'notes of dissent' on most fundamental areas of state reform. On the other hand, the question of how to ensure the constitutional and legal obligations and a specific roadmap for implementing the agreed-upon reform pledges remains unresolved, which risks crushing the hopes for reform and deepening the political crisis.

This research was conducted, and the report was written by TIB researchers Shahzada M. Akram, Md. Julkarnayeen, Farhana Rahman, Md. Mostafa Kamal, and Md. Mohaimenul Islam. The research was led by Muhammad Badiuzzaman, Director, Research and Policy Division of TIB. Israt Rubaba Tahsin and Asif Karim Chowdhury assisted the data collection process. Special thanks are for Professor Dr. Sumaiya Khair, Adviser, Executive Management of TIB, for providing valuable feedback and support during the various stages of the research. I also express my gratitude to Mohammad Tauhidul Islam, Director of the Outreach and Communication Division, and colleagues from the Research and Policy Division and other divisions for their important feedback on the report's presentation.

Our efforts will be successful if the interim government and stakeholders benefit from the findings of this research in their state reform endeavours. Suggestions from readers for the improvement of this report are welcome.

Dr. Iftekharuzzaman  
Executive Director

# One Year After the Fall of the Authoritarian Regime: Expectations and Realities

## Executive Summary

### Context

- The student-led quota reform movement transformed into an anti-discrimination movement, eventually leading to the fall of the authoritarian government on August 5, 2024.
- An Interim Government, led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser, took over the responsibilities of the government on August 8, 2024. The present Advisory Council consists of a Chief Adviser, 22 Advisers, three Special Assistants to the Chief Adviser (positions equivalent to Advisers), and another seven Special Assistants (positions equivalent to State Ministers).
- The principal aspirations of the students and general people involved in the anti-discrimination movement are state reforms and a new political settlement to create a 'New Bangladesh' characterised by non-discrimination, equal rights, and inclusiveness. The primary goals of the movement are radical reforms in people's representation, government, and administrative systems and practices, aiming to establish an accountable government system —the foundation of the movement and the current reform process.
- At the time of assuming office and throughout its tenure, the Interim Government faced various challenges — an unstable economy; pressure to repay foreign debts; non-cooperation from the allies and groups who unduly benefited from the ousted regime across all sectors and institutions; fragile state institutions; a corrupt service delivery system; deterioration of law and order and widespread unrest; and natural disasters.
- Expectations of students and the public after the fall of the authoritarian regime: establishing the rule of law, a corruption-free and accountable state and administration, reforming political and electoral frameworks, sector and institution-based reforms, transferring the power of the state to the elected government, economic stability, and creating employment opportunities for the youth population.
- Given the continuity of time and the prevailing situation, the core objectives of the Interim Government:
  - **Justice** – Fair investigation and trial of the charges of crimes against humanity and violations of human rights committed during and before the anti-discrimination movement.
  - **Reform** – reform of the state, political, and electoral system, various sectors and institutions.
  - **Election** – free, fair, and participatory elections at the earliest possible time.
- The main objective of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) is to promote democracy and good governance and to act as a supportive force in preventing corruption. Related research and policy advocacy are integral parts of TIB's ongoing activities.
- Previously, TIB tracked and assessed the progress in fulfilling the state and government's commitments to good governance, democratic advancement and controlling corruption.
- To assist in the undertaking of necessary structural reforms to establish democracy, good governance, and integrity and, ensure effective anti-corruption measures, TIB submitted a set of strategic policy recommendations to the Interim Government (on 28 August 2024), followed by the dissemination of sector-specific policy briefs, reviews of draft laws, which were subsequently shared with authorities,

dissemination of recommendations to various task forces and committees, and consultation meetings with high level officials, including advisers, all of which are still ongoing.

- Regular monitoring of the activities of all stakeholders, including the Interim Government, is crucial to fulfilling expectations for state reform — an observation-based report on the first 100 days after the fall of the authoritarian regime was published on 18 November 2024.
- In continuation of this, the current research initiative has been undertaken to track and analyse the course of events of the first year after the fall of the authoritarian regime.

## Research Objectives

### Main Objective

To observe and assess the course of events of the first year under the interim government after the fall of the authoritarian regime.

### Specific Objectives

- To review activities related to justice, reform, elections, state or government functions, control of corruption, and the establishment of democracy and good governance
- To assess the roles of various stakeholders
- To identify the limitations and challenges of the Interim Government in light of good governance indicators

## Scope of the Study

The areas covered in the research-

- **Justice** – Investigation and trial of the charges of crimes against humanity and violations of human rights committed during and before the anti-discrimination movement.
- **Reform** – reform of state, political, and electoral system, various sectors and institutions.
- **Elections** – Activities related to holding free, fair, and participatory elections.
- **State/Government Functions** – Regular activities across various sectors (law and order, finance, education, health, local government system, power and energy, environment, foreign employment, international relations, etc.).
- Control of corruption, irregularities and money laundering.
- **Roles of Various Stakeholders** – Political parties, civil society, media, and the Bangladesh Army.

## Research Methodology and Timeline

**Research Methodology:** Primarily, qualitative data were collected and analysed using qualitative methodologies; quantitative data were used in specific cases where applicable.

**Data Collection and Analysis Method:** The information collected from various sources and verified for its accuracy and reliability with both direct and indirect sources.

**Sources of Information:** Relevant government circulars, ordinances, and regulations (draft/final); news reports, articles, opinions, and analyses published in newspapers and websites; published interviews of political activists, experts, researchers, journalists, representatives from students, and civil society; website of government and other relevant offices.

**Reference Period for Data Collection and Analysis:** 5 August 2024 to 4 August 2025.

## Study Findings

### Justice – Crimes Against Humanity during the July Movement

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As of 4 August 2025, a total of 1,730 cases (including 731 murder cases) have been filed across the country against attackers, instigators, and commanders/directors involved in assaults and killings during the student-mass people uprising. As of 22 June 2025, an estimated 112 former ministers and members of parliament of the ousted regime have been arrested.</li> <li>The investigation of 70% of the cases shows 'satisfactory progress'. As of 30 June 2025, the investigations of 60–70 murder cases are in the final stages.</li> <li>Actions have been initiated against members of various law enforcement agencies involved in killings during the uprising. In the 11 months following the regime change, 761 cases were filed against 1,168 police officers across the country; 61 were arrested (as of 8 July 2025).</li> <li>The International Crimes Tribunal has started its work. There are 450 complaints, and 30 cases filed; 209 individuals are accused, including Sheikh Hasina, and 84 have been arrested. The trial process began before the amendment of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act.</li> <li>The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act has been amended - creating an opportunity to prosecute political parties.</li> <li>Formal charges have been framed against three people, including Sheikh Hasina, and the trial has begun.</li> <li>Almost all cases (752) filed during the student-people's movement (from July 1 to August 5, 2024) have been withdrawn across the country, primarily because they were filed to harass people and lacked merit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trial of those involved in the July-August mass killings is ongoing.</li> <li>Tribunal proceedings are progressing slowly.</li> <li>Aside from some departmental actions, little practical accountability of the police indicates a lack of political will and capacity.</li> </ul>

### Justice – Crimes Against Humanity during the July Movement

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A significant number of accused individuals have secretly fled the country; there are allegations of assistance from the army, law enforcement agencies, and local politicians in facilitating their escape.</li> <li>In some instances, false and baseless cases were filed, which include indiscriminate naming of accused persons. As of June 2025, approximately 150,000 individuals are charged, and 4,150 are arrested. There are 351 cases filed against Sheikh Hasina, including 214 murder cases.</li> <li>There are allegations of a 'case and arrest trade'. Many were allegedly included as accused due to prior enmity, political rivalry, extortion, or harassment; also, allegations of extortion in exchange for exemption from cases.</li> <li>Cases have been accepted without proper investigation due to political pressure.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Controversy and criticism over the appointment of judges and prosecutors in the International Crimes Tribunal; questions were raised regarding their competence, experience, and political affiliations.</li> <li>Despite the initiation of trials and some progress, the foundation of many cases remains weak due to the absence of specific charges matching the nature of crimes</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There has been secrecy surrounding the arrests of various individuals; there have been multiple reports of arrests of individuals from different places.</li> <li>Human rights have been violated – there are instances where arrested persons have been attacked in court, harassed in the presence of law enforcement; a former judge was attacked; defence lawyers were assaulted.</li> <li>Before and after the fall of the authoritarian government, various police stations across the country were attacked, and 44 police officers were killed in the violence.</li> <li>Instruction issued not to file any case, arrest, or harass individuals who actively supported the movement between 15 July and 8 August – criticisms over such blanket impunity.</li> <li>On the other hand, indiscriminate and retaliatory arrests and denial of bail.</li> </ul>	<p>committed by the individual accused.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparation of case reports faces challenges like procedural complexities and a lack of clear factual accounts.</li> <li>Arbitrary arrests and detentions continue in violation of legal procedures.</li> <li>The trial process is questionable.</li> </ul>

### Justice – Investigation and Prosecution of Enforced Disappearances

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The fact-finding report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been published.</li> <li>Bangladesh signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED).</li> <li>A Commission has been formed to investigate enforced disappearances and ensure justice for victims.</li> <li>The Commission for Enforced Disappearances has submitted two interim reports; 1,850 complaints have been filed with the commission, of which 1,350 have been verified.</li> <li>Four disappeared individuals rescued; 345 remain missing.</li> <li>Assurances have been given to provide 'missing certificates' to the families of the disappeared.</li> <li>The Director General of the RAB has publicly apologised to the nation, acknowledging the existence of 'Aynaghar' and the responsibility for disappearances and murders, but the military denied institutional involvement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government stances unclear on ensuring military accountability in enforced disappearance cases.</li> <li>Lack of clarity on the government's position on implementing the recommendation to dismantle RAB.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trial of enforced disappearances is progressing slowly. There are allegations of the destruction of evidence by security and law enforcement agencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is a lack of accountability regarding the destruction of evidence.</li> </ul>



## Reform – Establishing National Consensus

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formation of 11 sector-specific and institution-based reform commissions in two phases. These sectors and institutions include Public Administration, Judiciary, Electoral System, Constitution, Police, Anti-Corruption Commission, Media, Health, Women's Affairs, Labour, and Local Government.</li> <li>The main recommendations of the 11 reform commissions total more than 1,700, and all commission reports have been submitted and published on the website.</li> <li>A total of 121 immediately implementable proposals from five reform commissions, excluding the Constitution Reform Commission, have been selected for implementation through government and relevant institutional decisions.</li> <li>A National Consensus Commission was formed on February 13, 2025. Its purpose is to: consider the recommendations of the commissions formed for reforms concerning the electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration, constitution, and anti-corruption ahead of the next national election; hold discussions with political parties and forces to build national consensus; and create a national position on important reform proposals related to the creation of the July Charter.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The rationale for selecting the areas for forming other commissions, outside of the six commissions established in the first phase of state reform, is not clear.</li> <li>The private sector has not been given due importance; a commission has not been formed in an important area like education.</li> <li>There are questions about the progress of implementing the immediately implementable recommendations of the five reform commissions formed in the second phase.</li> </ul>

## Reform – Establishing National Consensus

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>So far, political parties have actively participated in the dialogues of the National Consensus Commission.</li> <li>In two rounds, 67 dialogue sessions have been held under the commission: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the first phase (20 March – 19 May 2025) of discussion: Separate discussions with political parties on 166 key reform recommendations.</li> <li>In the second Round (from 3 June 2025 to 31 July 2025): 30 parties jointly discussing around 20 issues where consensus was not achieved in the first round; consensus reached on 19 issues.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Key issues on which a consensus has been reached: amendment of Article 70 of the Constitution; chairmanship of the parliamentary standing committees; delimitation of electoral constituencies; provisions related to the President's power of pardon; decentralisation of the higher courts; formation of the Election Commission and four other state institutions; formation of an independent police commission; term of the prime minister; the prime minister holding multiple posts; women's representation in parliament; formation of the upper house in a bicameral parliament; election of the president; powers and duties of the president; caretaker government; expansion of fundamental rights of citizens; method of constitutional amendment; fundamental principles of the state.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Questions raised about the process of forming a national consensus.</li> <li>No clear explanation of which proposals were prioritised for discussion, unclear criteria for inviting political parties, and ambiguity about what level of agreement constitutes "consensus".</li> </ul>

## Reform – Establishing National Consensus

Observations	Comments
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are allegations that the reform commissions are not representative – six commissions lack representation from religious and ethnic minority communities, the number of women is low, there is a high number of former bureaucrats, and teachers from a university got priority.</li> <li>Negative reactions have been seen to the reports of some reform commissions (Public Administration Reform Commission, Women's Affairs Reform Commission) – recommendations have been rejected, movements have started, and demands have been made to dissolve the commission. Regarding this, the government's position remained unclear.</li> <li>There is a lack of initiative and direction in implementing the recommendations of some reform commissions (Health, Public Administration, Police, Women's Affairs).</li> <li>Disagreements and contradictory positions among political parties regarding commission reports.</li> <li>Only 166 recommendations from five commissions were selected for national consensus; there have been no long discussions on the issues that are immediately actionable by the interim government.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Absence of a clear roadmap for how commission recommendations will be implemented.</li> <li>Recommendations not included in the dialogue face uncertainty about future implementation.</li> </ul>

## Reform – Establishing National Consensus

Observations	Comments
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is a lack of government initiative to reform the Information Commission and the Human Rights Commission.</li> <li>No initiative has been taken to reform the intelligence agencies (DGFI, DB, NSI, NTMC), which were used as primary tools for institutionalising authoritarianism, violating people's fundamental rights, extortion, and state capture, including in the financial sector.</li> <li>Some parties have inflexible positions on reforms.</li> <li>There are allegations of prolonging discussions by repeatedly discussing the same issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are allegations that the dialogue process has prioritised only the major political parties and emerging political forces.</li> <li>The signing of the July Charter with “note of dissent” from major political parties on several key fundamental reform proposals has created risks to achieving the core objectives of state reform.</li> <li>The consensus Commission’s decision on women’s seats in the National Parliament has led to controversy and a failure to meet expectations for effective representation of women.</li> </ul>

## Legal Reforms

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>50 laws have been enacted.</li> <li>Laws for administrative reform: appointment to government jobs; reducing the time for voluntary retirement; attendance rules; code</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weaknesses in the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Act, particularly the</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
<p>of conduct; Government Service (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025; name change of various government institutions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Laws related to crimes against humanity: The International Crimes Tribunal Act 1973 has been amended.</li> <li>▪ Anti-corruption: Policy on the disclosure of income and asset statements of advisors to the interim government and persons of equal status, 2024; Public Procurement (Amendment) Ordinance; Government Audit Ordinance, 2025.</li> <li>▪ Sector-specific laws: Judiciary (Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance, 2025; 'Judges Appointment Policy'; Women and Children Repression Prevention (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025); Financial Sector (Bank Resolution Ordinance, 2025; Fiscal Policy and Revenue Management Ordinance, 2025); Local Government (appointment of administrators in various local government institutions); Power and Energy (Rapid Supply of Power and Energy (Special Provisions) (Repeal) Ordinance, 2024); Cyber Security Ordinance, 2024.</li> </ul>	<p>undermining of its constitutional status and authority.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The hasty imposition of the decision to separate revenue policy from revenue administration has created risks of bringing the revenue system under the control of the executive branch, leading to an unprecedented crisis.</li> <li>▪ Amendments to the ICT Act have raised concerns about curtailing freedom of speech and expression.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In some cases, although all stakeholders were involved in the formulation or amendment of laws, their opinions were not reflected (e.g., Cyber Security Ordinance, 2024).</li> <li>▪ In certain instances, laws had to be revised following intense opposition after their enactment (e.g., Public Service [Amendment] Ordinance, 2025; Revenue Policy and Revenue Administration Ordinance, 2025).</li> <li>▪ 13 ordinances were issued only to change names.</li> <li>▪ Failure to meet expectations regarding the repeal of the punitive Section 14 of the Foreign Donations Act.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of data-based decision-making and transparency in the legislative process, including failure to assess potential impacts.</li> <li>▪ Repeated amendments following public criticism or protests may create distrust toward both lawmakers and the laws among implementers.</li> </ul>

### Institutional Reform: Public Administration

Observations
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Administrative reshuffles as a part of freeing institutions from party influence, following the resignations of heads and other officials of various institutions after the fall of the authoritarian government – promotions, appointments, forced retirements, cancellation of contractual appointments, and subsequent contractual appointments.</li> <li>▪ 1,061 reform and development-related steps taken in 54 ministries (as of June 22, 2025).</li> <li>▪ Promotions for officers who were deprived during the former government's term due to party considerations – more than 1,300 officers promoted to the ranks of Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, and Additional Secretary; among them, nearly 550 were promoted outside of authorized positions (supernumerary promotion) (as of April 26, 2025); 764 were given retrospective promotions.</li> </ul>

<b>Observations</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Forced retirement – a total of 40 individuals who completed 25 years of service were sent on forced retirement (February 20, 2025).</li> <li>Officer on Special Duty (OSD) – a decision was made to take action against District Commissioners (DCs) and Police Superintendents (SPs) who served in the three controversial elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024 – a total of 45 administrative officers at the rank of Joint Secretary and equivalent were made OSDs at the Ministry of Public Administration (January 19, 2025); the total number of OSDs is 516 (April 4, 2025).</li> </ul>

### Institutional Reform – Public Administration

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Various instructions provided – updating service-related information of officials; submitting asset statements of government employees; maintaining the confidentiality of any government information on communication platforms; restrictions on government travel abroad.</li> <li>Increase in benefits for government employees – an increase in incentives for employees of all levels in the 2025-26 fiscal year budget; 10 per cent for employees in grades one to nine, and 15 per cent for grades ten to twenty; effective from July 1, 2025.</li> <li>Recently, the government formed a Pay Commission for the revision of the salaries and benefits of the public servants.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nominal change - no actual reform or change in the administrative structure.</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ongoing chaos and indecisiveness in public administration.</li> <li>Lack of transparency and existence of irregularities and conflicts of interest in appointments and promotions within the administration, judiciary, and educational institutions.</li> <li>Allegations that some of the promoted individuals were previously involved in corruption and irregularities, were punished in departmental cases, and were collaborators in various misdeeds of the Awami League.</li> <li>The influence of the public administration cadre continues in the administration, despite grade-based discrimination, inter-cadre discrimination, promotion discrimination, and a lack of suitable officials; the number of administration cadre posts has nearly doubled.</li> <li>The establishment of the dominance/hegemony of other party/parties has replaced the dominance of one party's followers.</li> <li>Taking illegal benefits in the name of being deprived.</li> <li>Withdrawal of new appointees in response to criticism.</li> <li>Non-compliance with the recommendations of the reform commissions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The tendency for irregularities, corruption, and the spread of partisan political influence is ongoing - a barrier to fulfilling the aspirations for reform.</li> <li>Allegations of failure to follow specific criteria for promotions or for being deprived of a position - a lack of transparency.</li> </ul>

## Institutional Reform – Public Administration

Observations	Comments
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contractual appointments – Contractual secretaries appointed in 22 important ministries, divisions, and other institutions, including the Cabinet Secretary, the Principal Secretary to the Chief Advisor, and the Ministry of Public Administration (April 22, 2025); retired officials prioritised for contractual appointments, depriving deserving and promotion-expectant officers who were overlooked during the previous government.</li> <li>Government job appointments – jobs given to those who were recommended by the PSC but did not get appointed during the last government's term, while others who were recommended have not been appointed; a controversial dismissal of a total of 369 sub-inspectors (SIs) undergoing training at the Bangladesh Police Academy on charges of violating discipline.</li> <li>Discrimination in acting against officials for controversial activities.</li> <li>Ongoing movements by various levels of officials and employees against different government decisions and for various demands.</li> <li>Sluggishness in the work of the Ministry of Public Administration, other ministries, and various development projects.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of professionalism in public administration - visible failure to take a specific strategic stance and action to tackle various movements.</li> </ul>

## Institutional Reform – Judiciary

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appointments in the judiciary – Chief Justice, Justices of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General and public prosecutors have been appointed.</li> <li>The draft of the 'Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, 2025' has been finalised.</li> <li>The 'Supreme Judicial Council' has been formed.</li> <li>The draft of the Subordinate Court Judges Transfer-Placement Policy, 2024, has been prepared.</li> <li>Initiatives have been taken to amend several laws, including the old civil and criminal laws.</li> <li>Initiatives have been taken to establish separate courts and create positions to increase the disposal of cases.</li> <li>Judicial officials have been instructed to submit their asset statements.</li> </ul>	
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allegations of political bias in the appointment of law officers.</li> <li>Appointed judges reportedly lack sufficient competence and experience, causing delays in case resolutions.</li> <li>Despite finalising the draft, the separate Supreme Court secretariat has not yet been established.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expected reforms in the judiciary have not materialised – the tendency of political partisanship persists.</li> </ul>

## Institutional Reform – July Mass Uprising

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The draft list of martyrs and injured in the July Mass Uprising 2024 has been published.</li> <li>▪ A directorate has been formed and an ordinance has been issued - the 'July Mass Uprising Martyrs' Family and July Fighters Welfare and Rehabilitation Ordinance, 2025' has been issued; the special cell related to the mass uprising has been dissolved and the July Mass Uprising Directorate has been launched; the martyrs and injured of the mass uprising have been recognized as 'July Martyrs' and 'July Fighters,' respectively.</li> <li>▪ Financial assistance and rehabilitation - 'July Martyr' families have been announced a one-time grant of BDT 30 lakh and a monthly allowance of BDT 20,000; injured 'July Fighters' have been divided into three categories and decisions have been made to provide financial, medical, and rehabilitation benefits ranging from BDT 1 lakh to BDT 5 lakh; the allocation for the 2024-25 fiscal year was BDT 232.6 crore; the proposed allocation for 2025-26 fiscal year is BDT 405.2 crore.</li> <li>▪ Establishment of the July Shahid Smriti Foundation – The foundation has been providing financial relief, disbursing over BDT 111 crore in aid to a total of 7,497 martyr families and injured individuals as of July 2025.</li> <li>▪ Medical Care and Support – To ensure advanced medical care, 78 individuals have been sent abroad including Thailand, Singapore, and Turkey as of August 04, 2025. The government's commitment is reflected in the 2024-25 fiscal year's expenditure of over BDT 259 crore 68 lakh 4 thousand and 212 for one-time financial grants and overseas medical treatment for the affected families and individuals.</li> <li>▪ A key initiative has been the announcement of preferential treatment in education and job opportunities for the martyrs' families and the injured.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Prioritising education and employment contradicts the spirit of the anti-discrimination movement.</li> </ul>

## Institutional Reform – July Mass Uprising

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Declaration of Days - August 5: 'July Mass Uprising Day' (public holiday); July 16: 'Martyr Abu Sayeed Day'; August 8: 'New Bangladesh Day' cancelled.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Delay in publishing a final and complete list of the deceased and injured, no finalised list yet.</li> <li>▪ Discrepancies between official and unofficial figures of casualties.</li> <li>▪ Monthly allowances have not yet been introduced.</li> <li>▪ Protests and clashes at various times demanding proper compensation and rehabilitation for the injured; vandalism at the office of the July Martyr Memorial Foundation.</li> <li>▪ Controversy over the appointment of the CEO and Treasurer of the Foundation – objections raised by martyr families.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Failure to finalise the actual list of deceased and injured of the uprising is a sign of the government's failure.</li> <li>▪ Lack of attention to providing proper compensation, medical treatment, and rehabilitation for those</li> </ul>



Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allegations of irregularities and corruption in the disbursement of grants in some cases.</li> <li>Initiative to build 804 flats for martyr families, but the project was not approved by ECNEC due to abnormal cost estimates.</li> <li>Deficiencies in compliance with public procurement regulations in the plan to construct a “July Uprising Memorial Museum”.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>injured in the July uprising.</li> <li>The initiative to construct flats has created opportunities for corruption.</li> </ul>

#### Election:

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restructuring the Election Commission – The Election Commission was reformed under existing laws; various political parties participated in the process.</li> <li>The initiatives and activities taken by the new Election Commission – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political Party Registration – The current number of registered political parties is 50; a few new political parties have been registered under the EC (Gono Odhikar Parishad, Nagorik Oikya, Gonosamhati Andolon, AB Party, Bangladesh Minority Janata Party); a total of 144 political parties has applied to the Election Commission (EC) for registration.</li> <li>The Supreme Court lifted the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami – Election Commission (EC) reinstated its registration as a political party, assigning the "Daripalla" (weighing scale) as its official election symbol.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Amendment of the law to declare the activities of the Awami League banned; subsequently, suspension of its registration.</li> <li>Election Preparation – Policy-level and final approval of the draft of <i>National Parliament Constituency Delimitation (Amendment) Ordinance 2025</i>; The EC published the draft Code of Conduct for political parties and candidates on its website and invited citizens to provide feedback before finalised.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The process through which the activities of the Awami League were banned under pressure from several parties poses the risk of creating a political culture of suppressing opposition in the future.</li> <li>The amendment of laws to ban political parties has drawn serious concern from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The IG has not provided any clear roadmap regarding justice, reform, and elections.</li> <li>Some political parties have criticised the process of reforming the Election Commission.</li> <li>Allegations have been made that the government is backing the formation of a political party (the so-called “King’s Party”).</li> <li>Political parties have taken different positions regarding the timing of the national election and exerted pressure on the government; most parties have demanded that the election should be held by December 2025.</li> <li>The government initially stated that the parliamentary election would take place sometime between December 2025 and June 2026 — but under pressure from the BNP and following a meeting in London between the BNP Chairperson (acting) and the Chief Adviser, the government announced that the election would be held by February 2026, subject to final preparations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The absence of a clear roadmap from the Interim Government regarding the election has created scope for future political instability</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Discontent emerged between the Interim Government and other political parties over the announcement of the election date through a meeting held only with the BNP, resulting in a boycott of the consensus commission meeting.</li> <li>▪ Disagreements have also arisen over the timing of local government elections.</li> </ul>	
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### State/Government Operations: Law and Order

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Major reshuffling in the police force — including dismissals, promotions, postings, and transfers</li> <li>▪ Arrest of top criminals; arrests following some “mob violence” and incidents</li> <li>▪ Ongoing extension of special magistracy powers for the armed forces to help maintain law and order, renewed every two months since August 2024</li> <li>▪ Nationwide “Operation Devil Hunt” conducted from 8 February to 1 March 2025, involving all law enforcement agencies — 12,500 individuals arrested in 21 days</li> <li>▪ Regular operations are conducted to maintain law and order</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Focus remains solely on promotions, postings, and transfers in the police force, rather than on fundamental reforms</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Decline in the police force’s public image due to its negative role during the movement — attacks on various police stations across the country before and after the fall of the government; 44 police personnel killed in violence at different locations; absence of police operations nationwide; looting of weapons and ammunition from police stations; slow resumption of police activities; many officers not reporting for duty</li> <li>▪ Continued deterioration of law and order — incidents of murder, robbery, theft, mugging, rape, protests, looting, and widespread unrest</li> <li>▪ Increasing tendency to take the law into one's own hands ("mob justice") — alarming rise in deaths from public beatings; the Chief Advisor’s Press Secretary described the mob as a ‘pressure group’ of the outraged people.</li> <li>▪ Growing trend of forming mobs to press demands — in some cases, demands have been met.</li> <li>▪ Arbitrary inclusion of names in cases, allegations of arrest-related corruption, and increased arrests under political pressure.</li> <li>▪ Continued extrajudicial killings and custodial deaths.</li> <li>▪ Discriminatory policing in suppressing protests — leniency toward some groups, repression of others.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Police apathy and reluctance to perform duties reflect a lack of professionalism</li> <li>▪ Questions raised about the capacity of law enforcement agencies</li> <li>▪ The government's role in curbing social intolerance is under scrutiny.</li> </ul>

### State/Government Operations: Judicial Services

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Twelve-point directive issued by the Chief Justice to ensure transparent and accountable conduct of officials and employees, and to provide services to the public more easily.</li> </ul>	



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formation of a high-powered task force comprising experienced personnel from various agencies to investigate High Court cases.</li> <li>Two committees formed at the district and ministerial levels to recommend the withdrawal of politically motivated cases — recommendation for withdrawal of a total of 15,600 such cases (as of 21 July 2025).</li> </ul>	
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exemption granted from cases and verdicts filed during the previous government's tenure.</li> <li>Failure to resolve longstanding cases, while in some instances, trials are being rushed.</li> <li>Disorder within court premises — incidents of harassment against judges and lawyers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Questions raised over the process of granting exemption and remission of sentences from cases and verdicts filed during the previous government's tenure.</li> <li>Political considerations influencing the resolution of cases.</li> <li>Failure to ensure the security of judges, lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants in court.</li> </ul>

#### State/Government Functions: Financial Sector

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formation of various committees and task forces for financial sector reform and preparation of reports — a white paper outlining the country's overall economic situation; redefinition of economic strategies and mobilisation of necessary resources for equitable and sustainable development.</li> <li>Various initiatives in the financial sector — price control, banking sector reform, incentives for remittances, stock market reform, anti-money laundering measures, regulation of the dollar exchange rate, and revenue recovery through tax evasion audits.</li> <li>Reduction in inflation — overall inflation decreased from 10.49% in August 2024 to 8.48% in June 2025.</li> <li>Increase in foreign currency reserves — currently at 30 billion USD; usable reserves under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) methodology are close to 24.99 billion USD; remittance inflow for fiscal year 2024-25 reached 30.33 billion USD, a 26.83% increase compared to the previous year.</li> <li>Initiative taken to increase imports from the United States; the reciprocal tariff rate on Bangladesh has ultimately been set at 20%, down from the initial 35%.</li> <li>Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) organised an investment conference, securing a total of 15.8</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The public lacks the desired relief — pressure from inflation, insufficient growth in employment, and an increase in the number of poor people.</li> <li>Stagnation in both public and private sector investments.</li> <li>Although there are signs of comfort in reserve management, structural pressures and the amount of truly usable reserves remain limited.</li> <li>Although major disasters have been averted for now, continued dialogue will be necessary to survive in a competitive market.</li> <li>Criticism of the investment conference's outcomes; despite demand for foreign</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
<p>billion USD in FDI during the first three months of 2025 (January–March).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to exclude development projects that were politically motivated and economically less important or unnecessary.</li> </ul>	<p>financing, inefficiency and lack of good governance in its utilisation pose long-term risks.</p>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although the budget is formulated based on accurate data and evidence, sector-wise allocations follow traditional patterns — in the 2025–26 fiscal year budget, overall allocation for social security has been reduced; education and health sectors received conventional allocations that are significantly below requirements; social security programs such as shelter projects were excluded.</li> <li>Allegations of disregarding the recommendations of white papers and task force reports — claimed absence of their reflection in the budget formulation.</li> <li>While some reform commission recommendations have been adopted, there are complaints regarding their implementation methods.</li> <li>Although the formation of a bank commission for long-term banking sector reform has been proposed, no initiatives have been taken so far.</li> <li>Approximately 24.13% of the country’s total disbursed loans (420,334 crore taka) have become non-performing loans (according to first quarter data of 2025).</li> <li>In the 2024–25 fiscal year, revenue collection stood at 370,000 crore taka against the revised target of 463,000 crore taka — a shortfall of approximately 94,000 crore taka.</li> <li>Despite owners’ agreement to implement 18 demands, including monthly attendance bonuses, meal and increasing night allowances, and minimum wage for ready-made garment workers, some owners failed to implement these, withholding workers’ salaries and bonuses, and biometric blacklisting.</li> <li>Disorder in the ready-made garment sector — at least 150 factories have been shut down across the country.</li> <li>Slow implementation of the Annual Development Plan — in the 2024–25 fiscal year, the lowest ADB implementation rate in 20 years at 67.85%.</li> <li>The stock market remains unstable; significant action has not been taken against those accused of corruption.</li> <li>Abolition of the National Board of Revenue (NBR) and formation of two separate divisions named Revenue Policy and Revenue Administration — following protests by revenue officials, amendment of this law was announced; illegal assets of officials involved in the protests are being investigated, with compulsory retirement and temporary suspension imposed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The budget does not adequately reflect the needs of marginalised groups and priorities for human development.</li> <li>Absence of explanation from the government for ignoring to implement the recommendations of reform commissions in policymaking.</li> <li>Failure to meet revenue collection targets in any month; targets are not achieved in key areas such as import duties, value-added tax (VAT), and income tax.</li> <li>Government’s failure to protect workers’ rights in factories and to control unrest.</li> <li>Instability and lack of accountability in the stock market pose significant challenges to restoring investor confidence.</li> <li>Allegations of a lack of government transparency and inadequate stakeholder inclusion at all levels in the formation of two new divisions after the dissolution of the NBR.</li> <li>Protests and work stoppages by NBR officials — the government’s role has come under scrutiny.</li> <li>Deficiencies in transparency and effectiveness were observed in the government’s diplomatic strategy and stakeholder engagement</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government initiatives in response to the U.S. reciprocal tariffs — allegations of not including relevant stakeholders and experts in negotiations with the U.S. on reciprocal tariffs; the signing of non-disclosure agreements.</li> </ul>	<p>regarding the retaliatory tariff issue.</p>

### State/Government Functions: Education

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formation of a search committee to recommend the appointment of vice-chancellors for all public universities in the country.</li> <li>Multiple postings and transfers within institutions under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, as well as appointments and transfers in various educational institutions.</li> <li>Initiatives to hold student council elections in various public universities.</li> <li>Abolition of student politics and “gano room” (a mass overcrowded residential large room for several students) practices in several universities.</li> <li>Directives to form new ad-hoc or temporary committees in private educational institutions; determination of educational qualifications for ad-hoc committee chairpersons in private colleges.</li> <li>Various initiatives in technical and vocational education.</li> <li>One-grade promotion for government primary school head teachers.</li> <li>Special benefits for teachers and staff enrolled under the private MPO (Monthly Pay Order) system, including salary increases.</li> <li>Initiative to appoint head teachers in 2,382 government primary schools.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Questions raised about the transparency of appointments and transfers in various educational institutions — allegations of undue influence.</li> <li>Despite announcements to ban student politics, factional and partisan student politics continue in most educational institutions — student politics remains a major cause of unrest in the education sector; the purpose of banning student politics is being undermined, and aspirations are being ignored.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Following the resignation or removal of vice-chancellors, appointments were made in 48 universities; however, questions have been raised regarding the criteria and transparency of the recruitment process — with allegations of political affiliation in most cases.</li> <li>Decisions influenced by pressure from students and the public — changes made to textbook content and graphics related to Indigenous peoples; committee dissolutions; appointment, removal, and transfer of teachers; cancellation of coordination committees formed to oversee revision and refinement of free textbooks.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to break away from the practice of appointing vice-chancellors based on party allegiance and ideological loyalty.</li> <li>The cancellation of coordination committees and various other decisions reflects a submissive approach.</li> <li>Tendency to accede to both reasonable and unreasonable demands raised by various</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuous protests by teachers and students in various educational institutions demanding diverse issues.</li> <li>Delays in the distribution of free textbooks — book distribution for 2025 was completed only in March.</li> </ul>	<p>groups; lack of initiatives to identify crises and implement well-thought-out solutions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inability to take comprehensive and planned measures to resolve the education crisis, or slow progress in certain areas.</li> </ul>

### State/Government Functions: Health

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In certain cases, incentives have been provided — promotion of 7,000 doctors; decision to increase trainee doctors’ allowance by 30%, raising it to Tk. 35,000.</li> <li>Plan to establish a ‘pharmacy network’ nationwide to ensure easier access to medicines; initially, pharmacies will be set up in 700 government hospitals across the country.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transfers and reshuffles in various institutions — allegations of cancellation of appointments, transfers, and postings influenced by a particular group of doctors within health administration, medical education, and district-level healthcare facilities.</li> <li>Failure to ensure proper medical treatment for those injured in anti-discrimination protests — complaints of incomplete treatment; accusations against injured individuals from the student-public uprising of occupying hospital beds even after recovery.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disorder persists in this sector due to factional and partisan politics.</li> </ul>

### State/Government Functions: Local Government System

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Removal of elected representatives at all tiers of local government institutions and appointment of administrative officials — mayors of 12 city corporations, chairmen of 60 district councils, and all chairmen, vice-chairmen, female vice-chairmen of 493 upazila parishads, and mayors of municipalities across the country — a total of 1,876 elected representatives removed across these four tiers of local government.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disorder and delays in service delivery by local government institutions.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since August 5, out of 4,580 Union Parishads across the country, 1,416 Union Parishad Chairmen have been absent from their offices — in the absence of elected representatives, finalising the list of actual beneficiaries under social safety net programs has</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negative impact on social safety net programs — beneficiaries faced</li> </ul>

<p>become difficult; a decision taken to prepare a new list; other service activities have also been disrupted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Following a court ruling, Mayors of Chattogram City Corporation and Dhaka South City Corporation were appointed. Protests flared in Dhaka South City over complications related to oath-taking; due to conflicting positions between the elected mayor and a concerned adviser, a 43-day deadlock ensued; various service activities were disrupted.</li> </ul>	<p>hardship and delays in receiving allowances.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of coordination among the Ministry of Local Government, the Election Commission, and the Ministry of Law in appointing mayors and administrators; failure of the government to effectively manage protests.</li> </ul>
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### State/Government Functions: Power and Energy

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contract Delays and Reassessment — Reassessment of the exclusive agreement terms with Adani Power; cancellation of the term sheet for a floating terminal with U.S. company Excelerate at Payra Port.</li> <li>Repeal of the Quick Enhancement of Electricity and Energy Supply (Special Provisions) Act, 2010 — Formation of a national committee to review power and energy contracts; court ruling on provisions related to indemnity and the minister's unilateral decision-making authority.</li> <li>Decision Not to Renew Quick Rental Contracts — Initiatives taken to review agreements made during the previous government's tenure.</li> <li>Reversal of Electricity Price Hike by Executive Order; implementation of public hearings for determining fuel prices and setting gas and electricity tariffs.</li> <li>Reduction of Dues and Loan Restructuring — Payment of Adani's dues: around USD 1.5 billion paid up to June 2025; multiple international organisations have pledged to provide loans to settle outstanding debts.</li> <li>Reassessment of Priorities in Renewable Energy — Cancellation of at least 31 projects, which were approved by the previous government, these projects were intended for renewable energy production.</li> <li>Increase the Use of Renewable Energy — Initiatives to implement solar power and install panels on government buildings.</li> <li>Structural Reforms in Renewable Energy — formulation of the Renewable Energy Policy 2025; under this policy, initiatives have been taken to expand and strengthen the institutional framework of the Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legal provisions related to contracts pose obstacles to cancellation or renegotiation of agreements.</li> <li>Continuation of high-cost contracts sustains budget deficits and the influence of associated syndicates.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to disclose agreements signed with Adani and India</li> <li>The evaluation report of the agreements has not yet been made public.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of transparency and accountability in the disclosure and</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
	evaluation of agreements.

### State/Government Operations: Environment Conservation

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Environmentally friendly tourism — regulation of tourism in Saint Martin’s Island and Tanguar Haor.</li> <li>▪ Forest conservation — halt of mangrove destruction activities in Cox’s Bazar and cancellation of “protected” forest allocations; cancellation of the safari park project in reserved forests; ban on establishing new industrial plants near the Sundarbans; recovery of forest land (1,717 acres between August 2024 and March 2025); declaration of new wildlife sanctuaries.</li> <li>▪ Wildlife conservation — import of birds; protection of wild elephants; recovery of stolen wildlife.</li> <li>▪ Air pollution control — regulation and closure of brick kilns — 794 mobile courts conducted from January to April 2025; operations targeting other sources of air pollution.</li> <li>▪ Control of plastic usage.</li> <li>▪ Others — recovery of canals and rivers; termination of stone quarry leases; rescheduling of fishing bans.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Significant improvement in the natural environment of Saint Martin’s Island.</li> <li>▪ Economic hardship for the islanders due to tourist restrictions without alternative livelihood plans</li> <li>▪ Failure in some cases to prevent the destruction of forest areas.</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In 2024, Bangladesh ranked as the world’s second most air-polluted country, and Dhaka as the third most polluted city — PM 2.5 levels were 15 times higher than the World Health Organisation’s standards.</li> <li>▪ Failure to close stone quarries; failure to prevent deforestation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Opposition from local beneficiary political groups to various environmental conservation initiatives.</li> </ul>

### State/Government Operations: Foreign Employment

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Pardoning and repatriation of those detained in Dubai.</li> <li>▪ Increased opportunities for investment by expatriates.</li> <li>▪ Simplification of the migration process.</li> <li>▪ Decision to increase staffing at Bangladesh missions abroad.</li> <li>▪ Decision to provide VIP services at airports for workers returning from the Middle East.</li> <li>▪ Progress in sending workers to Malaysia; agreements with several other countries.</li> <li>▪ Simplification of remittance transfer procedures and enhancement of incentives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Due to various limitations in the VIP service at airports, migrant workers are discouraged from using it.</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Allegations persist that expatriates remain neglected even after the mass uprising.</li> </ul>	

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Despite significant progress in remittance inflow, there has been a decline in foreign employment.</li> <li>▪ Failure to dismantle the recruiting agency syndicate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of a concrete plan to explore alternative labour market destinations.</li> </ul>

### State/Government Operations: International Relations

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Continued support for Bangladesh’s interim government.</li> <li>▪ Provision and pledges of financial and other assistance from various international organisations.</li> <li>▪ Support for anti-corruption efforts — repatriation of laundered funds, prosecution of human rights violations, raising and investigating corruption allegations.</li> <li>▪ Emphasis by various countries and organisations on the protection of human rights, minority rights, the need for full and independent investigations into incidents of violence, safeguarding the right to peaceful protest, and upholding the rule of law.</li> <li>▪ Memorandum of understanding to establish the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Dhaka for a period of three years.</li> <li>▪ Progress in discussions regarding Rohingya repatriation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Despite an enhanced international image, questions remain about actual diplomatic achievements.</li> <li>▪ Lack of coordination and a tendency toward secrecy in information disclosure.</li> <li>▪ India’s unfriendly behaviour has led to a crisis in bilateral relations, resulting in continued negative impacts on internal stability.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of clarity in the government’s position and transparency regarding the policy decision on establishing a “humanitarian corridor” in Rakhine.</li> <li>▪ Unfriendly behaviour from India towards Bangladesh — expressing concern over Bangladesh’s internal affairs; continued killings and “push-ins” along the border; imposition of trade barriers; diplomatic tensions; no official response regarding the extradition of Sheikh Hasina.</li> </ul>	

### Prevention of Irregularities and Corruption

Observations	Comments
<p><b>Progress</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Inquiries, Investigations, and Cases – The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has launched a campaign, initiating inquiries, investigations, and filing cases against a diverse group of powerful individuals, including the former Prime Minister, influential ex-ministers, MPs, politicians, business leaders, bureaucrats, police officials, and other public servants, as well as</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ACC’s activity level appears to have increased compared to the past.</li> </ul>



Observations	Comments
<p>their families. As part of this crackdown, travel bans have been imposed, and bank accounts and assets have been frozen.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ACC's Actions – The ACC has been highly active, with 768 inquiries launched and a total of 399 cases filed. Notably, charge sheets have already been submitted in over 80% of these cases (321 cases).</li> <li>▪ Accused in Cases – From January to March 2025 alone, 477 individuals were accused in 153 cases. A significant detail is that the largest group of the accused were government officials, numbering 144.</li> <li>▪ "Black Money" Provision – A controversial provision in the 2025-26 fiscal year budget that would have allowed individuals to legalise illicit "black money" through the purchase of flats and land without facing questions was initially retained. However, following a storm of public criticism, the opportunity was ultimately withdrawn.</li> <li>▪ Mandatory Asset Statements – To ensure greater accountability, all government officials and employees across the country have been directed to submit their asset statements annually by December 31.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Despite various anti-corruption efforts and initiatives, the overall corruption situation has not improved.</li> <li>▪ The absence of any mechanism to scrutinise submitted asset declarations may undermine the core objective of such measures.</li> </ul>

### Prevention of Irregularities and Corruption

Observation	Comment
<p><b>Limitations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ There has been a notable lack of initiative in implementing the recommendations of the ACC Reform Commission.</li> <li>▪ While inquiries have targeted "high-profile" individuals, there have been no visible arrests or progress in the judicial process so far.</li> <li>▪ The ACC has either withdrawn or is in the process of withdrawing over 50 cases filed over the past 15 years against various influential figures, including BNP leaders. Key examples of these withdrawals include - the case concerning the alleged embezzlement and money laundering from Grameen Telecom, a case against a BNP standing committee member, a former MP, and a government official regarding irregularities in a plot allocation in the Tejgaon industrial area, the illegal wealth acquisition case against the chief editor of "Bdnews24.com" and the chairman of Bengal Group.</li> <li>▪ In a significant development, a special court has acquitted all the accused, including Khaleda Zia, in the Niko corruption case that was originally filed by the ACC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The ACC remains entangled in political influence, as evidenced by continued biased behaviour in launching investigations, filing new cases, and a pattern of withdrawing others.</li> <li>▪ Despite a widespread consensus on the need for ACC reform, the pace of progress is frustratingly slow. The government and the ACC have failed to take decisive, concrete steps to implement the "immediately actionable" proposals, leaving the future of reform in doubt.</li> </ul>



## Preventing Money Laundering

Observations	Comments
<b>Progress</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An inter-agency task force, now including nine key institutions, has been reconstituted under the leadership of the Bangladesh Bank Governor to tackle financial crimes.</li> <li>Assurances of support have been received from foreign governments and organisations to help in the fight against money laundering.</li> <li>Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) agreements have been signed with several countries.</li> <li>Following a joint appeal from Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), Spotlight on Corruption, and Transparency International UK, the UK government has already seized assets worth £185 million linked to money laundering.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Repatriating laundered assets is a long-term and complex process, and progress on this front has so far not been encouraging.</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A proposed law on Beneficial Ownership Transparency to prevent money laundering has been put forward but has been largely ignored.</li> <li>There is a concerning plan to settle money laundering cases against individuals through a compromise. An initiative is underway to amend the law to allow for the return of laundered money via such settlements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This move to incorporate a settlement process for returning laundered money into the law is highly risky, as it could inadvertently encourage further money laundering.</li> </ul>

## Role of Political Parties in the Reform Process

Observations	Comments
<b>Reform</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Several Islamic political parties, including Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, rejected the Women's Reform Commission and its report, and threatened to start a movement; at a Hefazat-e-Islam demonstration, insulting and obscene comments were made about the Women's Commission.</li> <li>A total of 33 political parties participated in the first round of the National Consensus Commission dialogue, while 30 parties participated in the second round of the sessions.</li> <li>Some political parties have taken rigid positions, particularly regarding the fundamental reform proposals in the reform reports; delays in reaching consensus have led to frustration and mutual blame among some parties.</li> <li>The NCP has criticised the National Consensus Commission discussions for including only political parties, claiming that they do not represent the aspirations of people from all levels of society.</li> <li>Some parties have claimed to set a “standard of consensus”.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allegations of intentional political pressure from several parties in the reform process.</li> <li>Allegations of giving more importance to three political parties (BNP, Jamaat, and NCP) in the consensus process.</li> <li>Rigid positions taken by political parties in the consensus meeting are based on their partisan interests.</li> <li>Despite making numerous proposals on reforms, many parties lack initiatives to ensure democratic practices, integrity, and necessary reform in their party.</li> </ul>

### Role of political parties in the Election process

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Distrust, suspicion, and controversy among the political parties exist regarding the election time, the tenure of the Interim Government and the reform process, raising concerns that the reform and electoral processes may be disrupted.</li> <li>▪ The political parties have attempted to position justice against humanity, reform process, and the election time in opposition to each other and have taken their rigid stances.</li> <li>▪ Divide within the anti-discrimination student movement due to conflicts over political ideology and power struggles; one faction formed a political party (National Citizens' Party – NCP).</li> <li>▪ New political polarisation centering on the election, political parties have broken old alliances and formed new political coalitions or blocs.</li> <li>▪ The emergence of new political parties and applications for registration following August 5, targeting the upcoming election; however, in the initial screening, none of the parties met the Election Commission's requirements; a significant number of the applicant parties were nominal or paper parties; the NCP also failed to meet the registration criteria.</li> </ul>	<p>Forming a political party from the anti-discrimination student movement is a significant development. However, although it was expected to evolve as a political force committed to good governance, free from corruption, and accountable to the people as part of a new political settlement, in many cases it has become questionable — it holds onto the existing political culture characterized by a lack of transparency in funding, partisan behavior, tendencies of using muscle power, properties grabbing and extortion, ultimately heading toward a self-destructive path.</p>

### Role of Political Parties in the State and Government Functions

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Influence of several political parties in the appointments, transfers, and promotions process across government institutions, including the Secretariat, without following any transparent or acceptable process or standard.</li> <li>▪ The BNP raised questions about the neutrality of two student advisers in the government and demanded their resignation; on the other hand, the NCP accused three advisers and Election Commissioners of favouring the BNP and demanded their resignation.</li> <li>▪ Incidents involving the destruction of shrines, harassment of women in public spaces, obstruction of arranging fairs, spiritual gatherings, music and drama events, attacks on libraries, and assaults on various minority and marginalised communities, with the involvement of several religion-based political parties.</li> <li>▪ Several political parties opposed various government decisions concerning the country's security and sovereignty, criticised the government and announced demonstration programs.</li> <li>▪ Questions raised about the jurisdiction of the Interim Government, particularly regarding the opening of an aid corridor, and the leasing of Chittagong port.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The practice of politicisation in the administration and educational institutions that existed during the authoritarian regime is continues — non-partisan individuals have been deprived of opportunities despite having the necessary qualifications.</li> <li>▪ Political tensions among parties over establishing dominance in the police, administration, and judiciary.</li> <li>▪ Political parties opposed the government on nationally important issues instead of offering constructive cooperation.</li> <li>▪ In some cases, encouragement or support for creating social unrest, the government has also failed to take firm action.</li> </ul>

## Role of Political Parties in ensuring law and order situation

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political parties blamed each other for the country's unstable political situation - they also accused the Interim Government of its failures.</li> <li>Internal conflicts and violence among various political parties occurred during this period — from August 2024 to June 2025, there were 471 incidents of political clashes and violence, resulting in 121 deaths and 5,189 injuries. Of these incidents, 92% involved the BNP, 22% the Awami League, 5% Jamaat-e-Islami, and 1% the NCP.</li> <li>After the fall of the Awami League government, attempts were made to seize control of institutions and activities previously occupied by the Awami League, leading to conflict — including every day from 53 transport terminals and stands in Dhaka; looting of stone resources from quarries and rivers; and the control over leases of bridges, markets, ferry terminals, sand and water bodies.</li> <li>Filing of politically motivated cases (e.g., accusations of being collaborators of the authoritarian regime or of involvement in killings during the uprising).</li> <li>Involvement in deteriorating law and order — mobilising mobs, blocking roads for protests, blocking police stations, and organising demonstrations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of compliance in ensuring the rule of law by some political parties.</li> <li>Continuation of a culture of dominance, forceful occupation, and extortion.</li> <li>Ineffective internal control mechanisms within parties; failure to take action against their activists; in some cases, a tendency on the part of the government to tolerate such behaviour.</li> <li>Solidarity among activists across different parties is driven by personal interests.</li> </ul>

## Role of Civil Society

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advocating for good governance and state reform and playing an active role in different issues, including politics, constitution, elections, economy, anti-corruption, and establishing good governance; providing feedback on draft laws; and proposing recommendations for legal and institutional reforms.</li> <li>Raising concerns over partisanship, forceful occupation, and extortion.</li> <li>Taking a position for human rights and against political violence; protesting attacks and harassment of journalists, writers, and human rights activists.</li> <li>Playing a role in promoting the rights to information and freedom of expression.</li> <li>Expressing concern over targeted propaganda, rumours, and misinformation spread by Indian media outlets.</li> <li>Conducting and disseminating various surveys evaluating elections, government legitimacy, popularity, and adopted initiatives.</li> <li>Civic engagement in international cooperation — efforts to repatriate laundered money; civic dialogue with the United Nations and development partners; promoting transitional justice,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Received negative reactions from some groups regarding comments on education curriculum committee and the private sectors.</li> <li>Widespread dissemination of misinformation, hate speech, and rumours on social media under the pretext of freedom of speech and thought, causing fear and anxiety among the general public.</li> <li>A few reactionary groups/mobs threatened certain media outlets.</li> <li>Obstruction of organisational activities at the grassroots level.</li> <li>The government demonstrated negligence in some instances.</li> </ul>

Observations	Comments
democracy, and human rights; reporting and networking activities.	

## Role of the Media

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Bangladesh improved by 16 positions in the Press Freedom Index 2025, as reported by Reporters Without Borders (RSF).</li> <li>▪ Twelve decisions were taken to implement the recommendations of the Media Reform Commission.</li> <li>▪ An Advisory Council Committee was formed to ensure the autonomy of Bangladesh Betar and Bangladesh Television.</li> <li>▪ There has been a tendency to misuse freedom of expression — spreading rumours and misinformation against opposition parties and the government through social media; misinformation is also being spread using logos of the printing and electronic media.</li> <li>▪ Growing tendency to use artificial intelligence (AI) in negative propaganda against political opponents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Although some amendments were made in the Cyber Security Ordinance, certain recommendations of the United Nations were not followed — in some cases, unclear definitions hinder freedom of expression, and certain provisions create opportunities for misuse of the law; there is a risk of establishing an overly controlling and surveillance-based legal framework.</li> <li>▪ The free flow of information within state institutions is not ensured; there is a tendency to withhold or hide information in government offices, and the practice of not proactively disclosing information continues.</li> </ul>
<b>Limitations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ During the period of the Interim Government, attacks and harassment against journalists, writers, and human rights activists continued.</li> <li>▪ A total of 496 journalists were subjected to harassment (from August 2024 to June 2025).</li> <li>▪ 266 were accused in murder cases related to the July uprising; three journalists were killed while on duty (from August 2024 to July 2025).</li> <li>▪ Editors of eight newspapers and news chiefs of 11 private television channels were dismissed, and at least 150 journalists were terminated.</li> <li>▪ Mobs were mobilised to create panic at media offices.</li> <li>▪ Controversial government actions regarding press accreditation cards — cancellation of press accreditation cards of 167 journalists in three phases; restricting journalists' access to the Secretariat during the fire incident; amendment of the Press Accreditation Policy, 2022.</li> <li>▪ Negligence of the Interim Government in effectively implementing the Information Commission and necessary reforms of the Right to Information Act.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Freedom of the media was not ensured even during the Interim Government; media freedom was undermined through different processes and methods.</li> <li>▪ The issue did not receive adequate attention in ensuring free flow of information and the public's right to information.</li> </ul>

## Role of Army

Observations	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The army played a pivotal and positive role during the final phase of the movement that led to the collapse of the authoritarian government.</li> <li>▪ The military is widely seen as one of the key pillars of power within the interim government.</li> <li>▪ They have publicly pledged to remain a non-political entity.</li> <li>▪ Investigations into human rights violations committed by the army and associated personnel are currently underway.</li> <li>▪ While the army has played a crucial supportive role in maintaining law and order, particularly in the face of the police force's moral collapse, it has shown a visible shortfall in its expected role of ensuring peace and stability in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, despite central authority.</li> <li>▪ The army has actively taken a stance against rumours and conducts regular public awareness campaigns.</li> <li>▪ The Chief of Army has repeatedly commented on the election timeline and also offered opinions during the investigation into the BDR massacre, raising questions about his jurisdiction.</li> <li>▪ No initiative has been taken to reform intelligence agencies like DGFI and NSI, which were used as key instruments for institutionalising authoritarianism, violating citizens' fundamental rights, engaging in extortion, and perpetrating state capture, particularly in the financial sector.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Chief of Army repeated public comments regarding the election timeline have become a source of controversy.</li> <li>▪ The army has also faced criticism and controversy for providing shelter inside cantonments during the political violence of July and August.</li> </ul>

## Some important examples of governance deficiencies

Nature of the lack of good governance	Notable examples	
<b>Deficits in the rule of law</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violation of legal procedures in arrests and remand</li> <li>• Extortion through the trade of mass cases and arrests</li> <li>• Impunity for incidents related to the mass uprising</li> <li>• Human rights violations — arrestees assaulted in court; Harassment in the presence of law enforcement agencies; attack on a former judge; assault on the defence counsel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Undermining of the constitutional status and authority of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)</li> <li>• Failure to follow specific criteria in matters of promotions or denial of promotions</li> <li>• The government's failure to control various movements</li> </ul>
<b>Lack of capacity and effectiveness</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to complete investigations into cases filed against the police</li> <li>• Questions raised regarding competence in conducting judicial proceedings</li> <li>• Lack of expertise and experience among judges and prosecutors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to meet revenue collection targets</li> <li>• Failure to implement the Annual Development Programme</li> <li>• Inability to ensure proper treatment for injured in the</li> </ul>

Nature of the lack of good governance	Notable examples	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government hesitation in taking a firm stance to control or suppress various movements</li> <li>• Inability to finalise the accurate list of those killed or injured during the uprising</li> <li>• Inadequate capacity of the police in maintaining law and order</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• anti-discrimination movement</li> <li>• Disruption in service delivery due to the removal of elected local government representatives</li> </ul>
<b>Lack of transparency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of transparency in recruitment, promotions, and dismissals across various institutions — including top government positions; judges, prosecutors, and officials of the International Crimes Tribunal and judiciary; administration; education; health; and the appointment of the CEO and Treasurer of the July Memorial Foundation</li> <li>• Sneaking behaviour of arrests of various individuals</li> <li>• Lack of transparency regarding the reciprocal tariff issue</li> <li>• Non-disclosure of contracts in the power sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of clarity in the government's stance and deficiency in information disclosure regarding the policy decision to establish a "humanitarian corridor" in Rakhine</li> <li>• Failure to ensure the free flow of information within state institutions</li> <li>• Tendency of government offices to hide information</li> <li>• Reluctance to practice proactive disclosure of information</li> </ul>
<b>Lack of coordination and participation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of representative composition in the Reform Commissions</li> <li>• Failure to involve all stakeholders in the process of enacting or amending laws</li> <li>• Inadequate inclusion of stakeholders at all levels in the restructuring of the NBR into two new divisions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of transparency and efficiency in stakeholder engagement regarding the reciprocal tariff issue</li> <li>• The lack of coordination among the Ministry of Local Government, the Election Commission, and the Ministry of Law on the issue surrounding the Dhaka South City Corporation mayor taking over his duties.</li> </ul>
<b>Indecision/ Change of decision</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determination of age for the entry of government jobs</li> <li>• Amendments made following strong opposition after the enactment of laws (e.g., Public Service Ordinance; creation of two separate entities by splitting the NBR)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Withdrawal of newly appointed individuals in knee-jerk response to criticism</li> </ul>

Nature of the lack of good governance	Notable examples	
<b>Lack of accountability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to hold accountable who assisted the accused in fleeing the country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of accountability for those involved in destroying evidence related to enforced disappearances</li> </ul>
<b>Political influence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appointments and promotions in the administration, judiciary, health, and educational institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exemptions and acquittals in corruption cases</li> </ul>
<b>Abuse of power and conflict of interest</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Irregularities and conflicts of interest in recruitment and promotions within the administration, judiciary, and educational institutions</li> <li>• Reduction of government ownership in Grameen Bank, tax exemptions, and approval of Grameen University.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflicts of interest in the appointment of public prosecutors</li> <li>• Allegations of attempts to suppress political opponents in one's own constituency, protect personal commercial interests, and influence the local administration and police</li> </ul>
<b>Corruption</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Illegal extraction of benefits under the guise of deprivation</li> <li>• Corruption allegations in DC appointments</li> <li>• Corruption in various service sectors, including passports, land, BRTA, WASA, and national identity cards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allegations of interference in the Anti-Corruption Commission's work</li> <li>• Corruption by the personal staff of two advisers</li> </ul>

### Overall Observations:

- The fall of the authoritarian government, achieved through unprecedented sacrifices in the anti-discrimination movement, is a golden milestone in the history of Bangladesh. It has created an extraordinary opportunity to build a 'New Bangladesh' through state reform and a new political and social settlement. In this transformative process, alongside the interim government, various stakeholders have played a crucial role in achieving this aspired goal.
- Despite confronting a range of internal and external challenges, the interim government made several significant moves and decisions during its first year in areas like justice, reform, elections, and state governance; however, the implementation has faced diverse and complex obstacles.
- Considering good governance, significant limitations have been observed in these sectors — failure to achieve the expected outcomes in establishing a well-governed, corruption-free, and accountable administration.
- Viewed through the lens of good governance, these sectors reveal notable limitations, falling short of the anticipated progress in building an effective, transparent, and corruption-free administration
- There is no concrete progress in the implementation of immediately actionable recommendations made by the reform commissions, hampered by bureaucratic complexities; a tendency to selectively adopt certain recommendations ("pick and choose").



- The interim government's failure to formulate and publish a clear and well-structured strategy and roadmap regarding its assigned responsibilities — justice, state reform, and elections — has led to a crisis of confidence among various stakeholders.
- A tendency toward ad hoc decision-making is evident within the government; in many instances, there is a lack of firmness and planning in administrative governance; decision-making processes often suffer from poor coordination among responsible actors; in some cases, indecision or reversal of decisions after they have been made has also been observed.
- In the realm of administrative and institutional reform, efforts to depoliticise have primarily focused on removing high-level officials; however, in practice, the trend of politicisation continues through the replacement of one party's influence with another's.
- Widespread reshuffles, instability within the police, administration, and other state institutions, along with efforts to forge new political alliances, have exposed institutional dysfunction, highlighting a visible lack of government control in these domains.
- The focus on advancing individual agendas has fueled rifts and tensions among key actors in the uprising, casting doubt over the realisation of state reform aspirations born from the mass movement. Clear fractures have surfaced on core reform issues, as the pursuit of electoral power takes precedence.
- There has been no fundamental change in Bangladesh's political culture — practices such as factionalism, extortion, land grabbing, and the pursuit of dominance continue. Embracing the core ideals of the anti-discrimination movement and achieving the vision of a reformed state and new political order remains a significant challenge.
- Institutional reform efforts are being obstructed from within, and the desire for reform has yet to be realised.
- Rights to information and freedom of expression continue to face serious challenges.
- While civil society's ability to support and critique the government reflects an overall atmosphere of openness and freedom of speech, excessive concentration of power among certain groups and the tendency to impose views pose significant barriers to the creation of a secular, equal-rights-based, and discrimination-free "New Bangladesh."
- The growing influence of religion-based politics has become apparent. In many cases, violence and coercion have endangered gender, religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity, conflicting with the spirit of anti-discrimination.
- Since most of the fundamental areas of state reform were agreed upon in the July Charter despite the inclusion of "notes of dissent" from major parties and their allies, the expectation that authoritarian practices would be effectively curbed remains difficult to fulfil.
- On the other hand, the question of how to ensure the constitutional and legal obligations and a clear roadmap for implementing the agreed-upon reform proposals remains unresolved, leaving the risk that the expectations for reform may be undermined and the political crisis may deepen.

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