Published: 21 June 2024
CIVICUS speaks about civic space restrictions in Bangladesh with Iftekhar Zaman, Executive Director of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), the accredited national chapter of Transparency International, a leading global anti-corruption organisation. Established in 1996, TIB strives to strengthen the capacity of the state and society to reduce corruption and advance good governance through research, advocacy, civic and youth engagement and public awareness campaigns.
Civic space conditions in Bangladesh worsened ahead of the 7 January election, a manipulated process with a foregone conclusion: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League secured a fourth consecutive term in office. In the run-up to the vote, protests were met with violence from state and non-state sources, thousands of opposition supporters were detained on fabricated charges and journalists were smeared, attacked and harassed. In view of the pre-election crackdown, in December 2023 the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded Bangladesh’s civic space rating from ‘repressed’ to ‘closed’, the worst category.
What’s the state of civic space in Bangladesh?
Bangladesh has a strong tradition of independent journalism and civil society activism, but in recent years civic space has been deeply affected by zero-sum game of politics as the two major political parties, Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party, have been on a confrontational course to stay in or gain power.
As a result, a political culture has developed in which political parties only accept election results if they win. Losing is not acceptable. Ruling parties have sought to neutralise their main political opponents through strategic manipulation of laws and institutions or by force. Other potential opposition forces have been largely co-opted in the same process while key institutions of democracy, including parliament, the administration, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and independent bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Election Commission and the Human Rights Commission have been deeply politicised and made ineffective to serve the purposes of power-centred politics.
As civil society and the media are seen as the remaining source of threat to political power, they are also being controlled, harassed and intimidated, resulting in a narrowing of civic space. The government has introduced or amended several laws to tighten restrictions. These include the old Digital Security Act of 2018, transformed into the Cyber Security Law in 2023, which is used to control civil society and the media by intimidating and criminalising freedom of expression, the free flow of information and criticism.
The situation worsened ahead of the January 2024 election. The media and civil society came under tremendous pressure, particularly those working on rights, good governance and anti-corruption. Several civil society organisations (CSOs) had their funding disrupted or frozen. In Bangladesh, CSOs need government approval to receive foreign funding. While the law sets a maximum waiting period of 45 days, this varies greatly from organisation to organisation. Some face increasing obstacles because the office that approves funding must work in line with government interests or design, and is increasingly under the control of security agencies, which ultimately decide who is or is not to be targeted for control.
Has the situation changed since the election?
While the government appears to have removed some of the most visible controls on freedom of expression and the flow of funds to CSOs it used prior to the election, the atmosphere remains intimidating and uncertain. Any critical report we or some other CSOs publish is accused of playing into the hands of the political opposition. We are often called ‘anti-state’ or ‘conspiratorial’. The government accuses CSOs, independent journalists and media of misinformation or disinformation, although in the absence of legal definition of these terms, these are interpreted subjectively and used for targeted intimidation and control. Based on these accusations, they have also continued to push for more repressive laws.
One such law is the Personal Data Protection Act. In this case, we were able to work with the government to comment on the initial draft and contribute to the next version, which included some improvements. However, the current draft still undermines the right to privacy of personal data by giving some government agencies arbitrary and sweeping powers to access personal data without judicial oversight. It is proposed to set up a data control agency to implement the Personal Data Protection Act, and we want this body to be an independent commission, which is good global practice. But they’ve kept it as a government body, so there’s scope for the law to be used to control personal data and introduce stronger surveillance.
Similarly, the Cyber Security Law is supposed to make cyber systems safer, but it’s actually made everyone who uses them, particularly digital platforms like social media, feel intimidated and less safe. Overall, I think the trend continues.
What are the main challenges CSOs in Bangladesh face in terms of resources?
CSOs working on human rights, governance and anti-corruption are dependent on external sources of funding. The availability of funding depends on factors such as the global context and donor priorities. In recent years, funding has decreased due to the impact of the global financial crisis and the pandemic.
It’s also worth noting that CSOs face some internal governance challenges when it comes to using funds with integrity and accountability. In two studies we conducted on CSO governance in Bangladesh, in 2008 and 2018, we found that many CSOs suffer from significant governance challenges, including issues of transparency, accountability and even anti-corruption safeguards. In another study we found that many of them lag behind government agencies when it comes to proactive disclosure. This weakens the legitimacy and credibility of civil society and reinforces the perception that CSOs are not sufficiently accountable and therefore need to be controlled. On the positive side, there are some civil society initiatives working together to improve governance, including through the National Integrity Strategy (NIS). We’ve worked with the government to develop an implementation strategy for the NIS and we’re campaigning together to improve internal governance practices and the transparency and accountability of CSOs.
Domestic legal and institutional difficulties, including restrictions on the flow of funds, also act as a disincentive to international support for CSOs and effectively conspire against the ability of CSOs to access funding. A government agency, the NGO Affairs Bureau under the Prime Minister’s Office, is supposed to be a one-stop shop for seamless funding for CSOs. But it has become a port of control rather than a facilitator.
The legal framework governing foreign funding is Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulations Act, which has existed under various names and was amended in 2006. We worked with the government during the amendment process, but at some point it came up with a new, rather vague provision that criminalises critical comments about the Bangladesh constitution and constitutional bodies if such comments are deemed to be ‘motivated or inimical’, punishable by up to 14 years in prison. This was intended to send a clear message of intimidation against efforts to hold power to account. Fortunately, it hasn’t been used yet.
The law also initially introduced the need to apply for approval on an annual basis. If you have a five-year project, you first need general approval for the project and its overall budget, which is a lengthy process – 45 days on paper, but in practice it can take months. Even if it’s approved, you can only get the money to cover activities for the first year – a period now reduced to six months. You will need to renew your approval every six months to continue receiving funding. You’ll also need the approval of the local authorities. If you’re working in 50 different locations across Bangladesh, you’ll need approval from all the local authorities concerned. This can be a real challenge because local authorities don’t always have a clear understanding of the projects and are often reluctant to go ahead without a bribe. This combination of bureaucratic control and corruption makes it very difficult for CSOs to operate smoothly. For governance, anti-corruption and rights-based CSOs in particular, it has become very difficult to implement work plans and achieve intended results. Even when donors acknowledge them, these challenges are a disincentive.
What are the conditions for the media?
As part of its role as the fourth pillar of democracy, the media are the main source of information, so it’s no surprise governments want to control them. That’s why they’ve introduced laws such as the 2006 Information and Communication Technology Act, the Digital Security Act 2018 and now the Cyber Security Act 2023.
These laws are meant to keep the digital environment safe and secure for media and other platform users. They’re not designed to control what people write or say online. But they’ve been used to criminalise news reporting and criticism. The Digital Security Act has been used most harshly against media workers, reporters and media institutions. The biggest and most widely read newspapers and their reporters and editors have been sued many times for their independent reporting. The purpose is to create an atmosphere of intimidation. However, alternative media continue trying to raise their voices, as do citizens active on social media, albeit less than used to be the case.
The restrictive environment is having an impact. Many media professionals and outlets are rethinking their professions and businesses, and some are moving on. There’s a second group of those who, by choice or by force, are co-opted and become beneficiaries of the system of control and even complicit in it. This gives them opportunities for profit and influence. And then there’s a third group of those who are desperately trying to survive while remaining true to the profession. They are forced to exercise a great deal of self-censorship and self-control to present their narratives in the least risky way. They face all kinds of threats from political authorities and through surveillance and control by security agencies.
We can’t say that there is absolutely no space for civil society and media freedom in Bangladesh. Those who are part of the system or have been co-opted have that unrestricted space. But the vast majority of those who want to operate while retaining their independence and professional integrity work under heavy restrictions.
There are additional challenges: the media landscape, as well as being politically biased and polarised, is also largely in the hands of corporations. These are challenges from within the media. Like elsewhere in the world, it’s common for large businesses to have their own newspaper, TV channel, online channel and so on. Media professionals don’t have the resources to set up their own, so they need sponsors and investors. But it’s very rare for these companies to allow editorial freedom. Competition between media outlets reflects the unhealthy economic competition between businesses.
What are the main issues TIB works on?
We work to strengthen state capacity to improve governance and to strengthen anti-corruption efforts through a whole-of-society approach. Of course, we don’t have anything against any particular government or political party – our target is corruption and other forms of abuse of power. So we try to work with government and other stakeholders to promote evidence-based legal, policy and institutional reforms and practices.
Over the years, we’ve contributed to the establishment of institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh and the development of several new policies and laws such as the National Integrity Strategy, the Right to Information Act and the Information Disclosure Protection Act, for which we worked with the government, in some cases alongside other CSOs. TIB’s research and advocacy also led to Bangladesh’s ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
Our work at the local level of civic engagement, particularly youth engagement, including through digital app-based community monitoring, is also catalysing changes in policies and practices in public service sectors such as education, health and land. There are other examples. Unfortunately, important as these are, such demand-side changes remain a drop in the ocean in the absence of adequate and proactive supply-side action, and many of the policies and institutions remain largely on paper; they’re not enforced, or are poorly enforced. But enforcing them is not our job, and we can only continue to strengthen the demand for enforcement.
Overall, we have engaged with the government on all laws and policies that affect civil society and the media. If a new law threatens press freedom or freedom of association, we’ll try to support the government and help it make changes in the public interest and from a rights perspective. We also help the media to improve their skills. For example, we have been providing training and fellowships in investigative journalism for many years. More recently, we have focused more on data-driven advocacy and campaigning, and have started training media professionals and students in data journalism.
What support does Bangladeshi civil society need from the international community?
What civil society needs most is moral support, particularly if the situation deteriorates, as well as technical support. It is also important that international solidarity is translated into funding.
In terms of the challenges we’ve discussed, I don’t see any tangible action or much real support from the international community. This includes international civil society, the diplomatic community, the donor community and development partners. These are our challenges, and we should be able to face them without relying much on what can come from outside, other than learning and sharing experiences. I’m also aware of their limitations, which are largely determined by their strategic and political interests in the country and the region. Therefore, there can be little measurable external effort to improve the situation of civic and media space in Bangladesh, apart for some expressions of concern here and there.
This means that change, if it is to happen, will have to come from within, and it will, as Bangladesh’s history shows. But at what cost and in what timeframe it will happen remains to be seen.
CIVICUS
June 21, 2024
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